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I. INTRODUCTION
It was simply a matter of time, budget constraints, and a necessary
battle of wills between regulatory determination and the participants in
the capital markets. While the regulatory methods of the Securities Ex-
change Commission (SEC) 2 and those of the fifty states have enjoyed
peaceful coexistence for over fifty years, that uneventful coexistence has
largely resulted from ambiguities in the regulatory process at the national
and state levels and the fine line between the supremacy clause3 and the
commerce clause. 4 All fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico have some form of securities regulation5 or blue sky laws.6 It was
inevitable that the question of the jurisdiction of the states in their reg-
ulation of the sales of securities would eventually be litigated with the
two provisions of the U.S. Constitution as the weapons of the respective
parties. While the more recent reforms by the SEC have sprung from
2 The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) is the Congressionally-created
federal agency given the charge of implementing and enforcing the federal se-
curities laws. Created under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78(a) et seq. (1989), the SEC regulates initial offerings of securities to the public
and the secondary market. This article focuses on the SEC regulation of initial
offerings.
I The supremacy clause comes into play when there is a conflict between state
and federal regulation, and is used to void a state statute when "compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility .... " Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), or where the state
law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress .... Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
not withstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, provides: "The Congress shall have Power ...
To regulate Commerce ... among the several States . The Supreme Court
has recognized that the commerce clause:
reflected a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason
for calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order
to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward
economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies
and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979).
5 See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
I "Blue sky laws" refers to state laws regulating the sale and registration of
securities. The term was coined in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
The Court described certain fraudulent securities offerings as "speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of 'blue sky'." Id. at 550.
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state and federal cooperation, 7 there still remains a form of territorialism,8
whether or not it is justified or supportable 9 on the part of the state
regulators to control which securities are registered, 10 sold in," sold
from, 12 or sold by companies located in13 their particular states. While
most regulators at both the state and federal levels espouse an attitude
and philosophy of cooperation, the fact is that, because of conflicts in
authority and unresolved constitutional issues, most nationwide offerings
are becoming more difficult to execute and are burdened by so many
bureaucratic loopholes that the role of the United States as a capital
market in the international sense may be greatly impaired. 14 The purpose
of this Article is to explain the coexistence of federal and state securities
regulation, define the resolved constitutional issues, and discuss those
that remain unresolved. Finally, the Article proposes a peaceful coexist-
ence for the dual regulators such that the regulatory system is not an
impediment to the United States being a significant player in the inter-
national capital markets.
7 Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-506 (1982), is the most recent evidence
of the flexibility demonstrated by the SEC and Congress in working to establish
more uniformity and simplicity in raising capital, particularly for smaller busi-
nesses. Regulation D is the result of the Small Business Investment Incentive
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
77s(c)(3)(c) (West 1989)), which was passed in response to demands for uniformity
and simplicity in the registration and sale of securities at the state and federal
levels, and the Omnibus Small Business Capital Formation Act of 1980 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) to (c) (1989)), which granted the SEC the authority "to
cooperate with any association composed of duly constituted representatives of
State governments whose primary assignment is the regulation of securities busi-
ness within those states 'for' the development of a uniform exemption from reg-
istration for small issuers which can be agreed upon among several States or
between the States and the Federal Government." 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(3)(1)(c) (West
1989). Twenty states now recognize Regulation D exemptions as state exemptions.
12 J. LONG, supra note 1, Appendix E.I The federal statutes make it clear that state laws can exist. See infra notes
15-16. This mutual coexistence has been reaffirmed with each amendment and
as late as 1980 with the passage of the Small Business Investment Incentive Act
with the following language: "Nothing in this Act ... shall be construed as au-
thorizing preemption of State law." 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(3)(C) (1989).
The territorialism results when the states adopt standards different from fed-
eral standards; for example, on the Regulation D offerings. The following twenty-
five jurisdictions have exemptions which are compatible with both Rule 505 and
506 offerings: Alaska, ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 08.501 (May 1984), 1 Blue
Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 8,448A; Arizona, ARiz. REV. STA. ANN. § 44-1844 (1987),
1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 9,536; Colorado, COLO. REV. STAY § 11-51-113.2(o)
(1987), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 13,113; Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAr
ANN. § 36-500-22(b)(9)(A), (B) (West 1987), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 14,422;
Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 5108, Rule 9(b)(9)(II) (1984), 1A Blue Sky L.
Rep. (CCH) Para. 15,419B; Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-9, Rule 590-4-5-.01
(1989), 1A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 18,441; Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 30-1435,
Rule 27 (1983), 1A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 21,426; Kansas, KAN. SWAT.
ANN. § 17-1262(o) (1985), KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-6 (1984), 1A Blue Sky L. Rep.
(CCH) Paras. 26,114 & 26.405E; Louisiana, LA. REV. SWAT. ANN. § 51:709 (West
1987), 1A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 28,511; Maryland, MD. Bus. REG. CODE
ANN. § 11-602, Rule .15 (1985), 1A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 30,441; Mas-
sachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch 110A, § 402(b)(a)(c)), 1A Blue Sky L. Rep.
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(CCH) Para. 31,472; Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.803.7 (West 1989),
1A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 32,483A; Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.402,
30-54.210 (Vernon 1985), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 35,520A; Montana,
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-10-105(1) to (21), Rule 6.10.120 (1984), 2 Blue Sky L.
Rep. (CCH) Paras. 36,105, 36,460; Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1111 (1982), 2
Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 37,415; New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-60(b)
(West 1989) (as to offerings other than real estate syndications), 2 Blue Sky L.
Rep. (CCH) Para. 40,125; New York, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-ff (McKinney
1982) (as to offerings other than real estate syndications), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep.
(CCH) Para. 42,132; Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 401, 406 (West 1982),
2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Paras. 46,151, 46,414; Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 59.025,
Rule 815-36-500 (1987), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 47,634; South Carolina,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 113-21 (Law Co-op 1987), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para.
51,521; Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2-103, Rule 0780-4-2-.04 (1988), 3 Blue
Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 54,414; Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4203, 4204
(1984), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Paras. 58,104, 58,404; Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-514(b)(14), Rule 503 (1989), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Paras. 60,114,60,439;
Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-14 (1989), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 57,413;
West Virginia, W. VA. CODE §§ 32-3-305, 15.06 (1988), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
Para. 63,496.
Kansas and Tennessee follow NASAA and limit their exemptions to Rule 505.
Colorado and New York regulate only intrastate offerings (where as Regulation
D exemptions apply only if the offering is interstate). Oregon and Alaska register
by coordination - federal approval or exemption is compliance with their re-
quirements.
The following states have exemptions based on the number of purchasers, but
the exemptions do not parallel Regulation D; hence, special structure would be
necessary in these states: Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.061(11)(a)(1), Rules 3E-
500.05 to .07 (West 1988), IA Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Paras. 17,106, 17,445-47;
Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-5, § 137.4G (Smith-Hurd 1989), 1A Blue Sky L.
Rep. (CCH) Para. 22,123; Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.203(9)(a) (West 1989), 1A
Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 25,113; Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.15 sub.
2(h) (West 1989), Reg. 2875.0180, 1A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Paras. 33,115,
33,408; Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-71-203(9), (10) (1988), 2 Blue Sky L.
Rep. (CCH) Para. 34,146; Nevada (25 purchasers), NEV. REV. STAT. § 90,530(11)(a)
(1985), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 38,179; Pennsylvania (25 purchasers),
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-203(d) (Purdon 1989), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para.
48,113; South Dakota (25 purchasers for domestic corporations, 5 for other is-
suers), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-31A-402 (1989), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
Paras. 52,224, 52,227, 52,835.
States with only Rule 506 exemptions are: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 830-X-6-.11
(1975), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 7471; Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §
67,1248(b)(14) (1980), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 10,114; Interpretative
Opinion, Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 10,661; California, CAL. CORP. CODE §
25,102(f) (West 1989), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 11,133; Rules 260.102.12
to 14), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 11,780A-C; Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-
2-1(b)(10) (Burns 1982), 1A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 24,102; Kentucky, Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 808 (Baldwin 1988), 1A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 27,415;
Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 874-A(c), 10502 (1988), 1A Blue Sky L.
Rep. (CCH) Para. 29,124; North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-17, Rule 1206
(1985), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 43,416; Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1707.03 (Baldwin 1989), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 45,103; Texas, TEx. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 8-401 (Vernon 1989), Rule 109.4(11), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep.
(CCH) Para. 55,554; Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 21.20.640, 460-44A-
501 to 503, 506 (1989), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Paras. 61,752 to 754, 757, 761;
Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.23(10) (West 1988), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
Para. 64,113.
The other states (Hawaii, Wyoming, North Dakota, New Hampshire, New Mex-
ico, and Rhode Island) have peculiar exemption requirements.
Ten jurisdictions (Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, D.C., Indiana, New York, New
Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Washington) recognize Rule 504 exemptions.
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The regulators at the state level cite protection of local investors and their
interest in seeing that their particular territories are not used as bases of oper-
ation to conduct illegal sales in other states, resulting in their state acquiring a
reputation as a center for illegal or questionable securities activity. 12 J. LONG,
supra note 1.
10 "States have traditionally regulated intrastate securities transactions, and
this court has upheld the authority of States to enact 'blue sky' laws against
Commerce Clause challenges on several occasions." Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 641 (1982) (citations and footnote omitted). The Court's rationale for
upholding blue sky laws was that they only regulated transactions occurring
within the regulating states.
1 "The provisions of the law ... apply to dispositions of securities within the
State . Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 557 (1917) (citing Ohio blue
sky laws).
12 "[W]hile information of [securities] issued in other States and foreign coun-
tries is required to be filed . .. , they are only affected by the requirement of a
license of one who deals in them within the State." Id.
13 One of the focuses of this article is the authority of state regulators to regulate
offerings not sold in the state but made by companies doing business in the state.
See Arizona Corp. Comm'n v. Media Products, Inc., 763 P.2d 527 (1988); supra
notes 11, 14, and accompanying text.
14 In the appellant's brief for Media Products, the appellant notes that control
by one state of a securities offering could result in a complete prohibition of sales
(a complete ban on interstate commerce). See Appellant's Brief at 24-25, Media
Products (No. CA-CIV. 9655).
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II. SEC AND STATE SECURITIES REGULATION:
QUASI-PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
A. Congressional Allowance of, and Limitations on Blue Sky Laws
It is clear that Congress intended that blue sky laws coexist with the
federal securities laws. In both the Securities Act of 19331 and the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 193416 there are clear statements that permit
state regulation and provide that the federal laws are not preempted. 17
When there is a direct conflict between state and federal regulation, a
preemption analysis becomes necessary. There will be a judicial finding
of preemption when: (1) compliance with both state and federal laws is
a "physical impossibility;"18 (2) federal regulation in the field is so per-
vasive that state regulation is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress;"'19 or (3) the
1 15 U.S.C. § 77r (West 1989) or Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933
provides: "Nothing in this subchapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities
commission (or any agency or office performing like functions) of any State or
Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, over any security or
any person."
16 15 U.S.C. § 78 bb(a)(1989) or Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the
securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any
State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the
provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder."
11 The legislative history does not offer much insight into why the provision
was included except that the original House version prohibited interstate sales
into any state where such sales would not have complied with that state's blue
sky laws. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 18, at 25 (1933). The hearings
indicate the provision was one of assurance to the states that their laws were not
being supplanted but supplemented. Federal Securities Act Hearings on H.R. 4314
Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 117(statement of Ollie M. Butler). The Senate deleted the House version and inserted
section 18, supra note 15, which has remained up to the present.
18 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963). In the case of federal securities laws versus state securities laws, many
argue there can be no problem of physical impossibility since the federal standard
is either less than or the same as state standards and the state requirements are
in addition to, not in contradiction of, federal standards. However, if an offeror
wants a Regulation D exemption, one of the requirements is that purchasers have
access to information (financial and otherwise) from the offeror. Unless the offeror
is registered in the state of principal operations, such information cannot be given
to the purchasers without risking a violation. The effect of state law here is to
override the federal exemption. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
1" Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978) and Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-
26 (1977). Again, this form of preemption is not a problem if the purposes of the
federal securities laws are perceived to be investor protection since all states have
the same or higher standards. If the purpose is changed, i.e., to assure uniformity
and ease of registration, then state regulation would be an obstacle. Presently,
state registration only adds more investor information and is consistent with
congressional intent in regulating securities. However, with Regulation D's au-
thorization there is some showing by Congress of an interest in easing the business
burden in obtaining authorization for registration.
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state legislation and regulation challenged so burdens interstate com-
merce (without a legitimate local interest or in excess of that local in-
terest) that the state blue sky regulations violate the federal domain of
interstate commerce.20 So long as states establish a regulatory scheme
within these three judicially confining constraints, the federal and state
regulators and processes can peacefully coexist. To understand when that
peaceful coexistence can occur, it is critical to understand the nature of
the state regulatory schemes.
B. Methods of State Regulation: Registration by Disclosure or Merit Review
State regulatory schemes face constitutional challenges when their
regulations are either more stringent than the federal regulatory schemes
or represent a state's attempt to take jurisdiction beyond that which is
necessary for protection of state interests. The regulation at the federal
level is regulation by disclosure and, in spite of issues of financial sound-
ness and a myriad of other problems that may exist with an offering, the
SEC will not prevent such an offering from being sold so long as there
is full disclosure. 21 However, state regulation varies from a standard of
SEC full disclosure review as a prerequisite for approval to a full scope
merit review process. With the first standard, there will be no conflict
with federal regulations. However, conflicts arise where the states un-
dertake to do more than the federal standards.
C. The True Areas of Conflict: Regulation of Specifics
The potential for conflict between state and federal securities regulation
is best illustrated by an example. Suppose that in a merit review state
a proposed offering has a problem with excessive dilution. 22 Under that
20 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). The fact that Congress has
specifically permitted state regulation hampers many commerce arguments. How-
ever, as will be noted later, there are times when the scope, and not the form, of
state registration can violate the commerce clause.
21 See In re Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648 (1945), in which the SEC
noted:
In contrast to some of the State officials and commissions, operating
under state "Blue-Sky" laws that authorize them to pass upon the
merits of securities registered with them, it is not this Commission's
function under the Securities Act to approve or disapprove securities
and the statute specifically makes it unlawful to represent that the
Commission has passed upon the merits of any security, or given ap-
proval to it.
Id. at 656 (footnotes omitted).
22 Excessive dilution exists when the promoters (principals) in the stock offering
are able to purchase stock at a substantial discount. Excessive dilution generally
is found when the price reduction for insiders is greater than 33 1/3%. See, e.g.,
S. WING & H. BLUMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW § 9.10[3] (1973).
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state's merit review process, the regulators could halt the offering,23 re-
quire that the promoters' shares be held in escrow for a period of time,24
or require a change in the terms of the offering. 25 In the event the offering
is halted or voluntarily withdrawn, the conflict between the state and
federal regulations becomes clear. The offering has federal approval for
national sale since the SEC standard of full disclosure does not require
that the issue of excessive dilution be pursued so long as the extent of
that dilution is fully disclosed in the registration materials and share-
holder prospectus. Yet, without state approval, or with a structured state
approval, the offering becomes fragmented and an administrative night-
mare if a sufficient number of merit states vary the terms of the offering
or even withhold approval.
There are several other forms of specific regulation that could stop
registration in a state in spite of SEC approval. These include provisions
regulating cheap stock,26 promoter investment,27 offering price,28 options
and warrants,29 excessive commissions or underwriting and selling ex-
penses,3 0 insufficient earnings, 31 inequitable voting rights,3 2 the offeror's
capital structure,3 3 and whether, generally, the offering is fair, just, and
equitable.3 4 Given these specifics and variations in the application of
standards, an offeror has little assurance of a national market for its
securities and, in many cases, could find its offering fragmented or in
various forms35 throughout the country. It is also at this point that the
2- For example, Arizona provides that a registration may be denied if it "would
be unfair or inequitable to the purchasers." ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1921(3)(1989).
24 Again, in Arizona, the regulators can require that shares be placed in escrow
or that funds from the sale of speculative securities be impounded. See APmz. REV.
STATE ANN. §§ 44-1876 and 44-1878 (1989).
25 The change could come by the issuer's voluntary amendment (see, e.g., ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1897 (1984)) or the escrow requirements noted infra note26.26 Cheap stock is a term used to refer to securities issued (sold or otherwise)
within the two years immediately preceding the public offering at a price less
than the offering price proposed in the registration materials. Cheap stock results
in excessive dilution and the accompanying control of the corporation by the
promoters who, financially, do not have as much at risk as the other shareholders
of the corporation. Hueni, Application of Merit Requirements in State Securities
Regulation, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1417, 1423-28, n. 23 (1968).
27 In the case of issuers who have no significant record of operations or earnings,
state securities regulators will typically require the promoters to hold an in-
vestment which equals at least ten percent of the total equity offering. The idea
is to ensure that the promoter is at risk and will, theoretically, use more effort
and care in operating the business and expending funds. Id. at 1421-23.
28 Regulators attempt to set offering prices on new issues so that consumers
are protected from overvalued issuances. The regulation has been called arbitrary
since basing the price on price-earnings is based on future earnings and setting
a "reasonable price" may cause the issuer to pull out of a particular state if the
stock can command a better price elsewhere. For example, the Texas statute
provides as follows:
Price if no established market or reliable earnings record. In offerings
where there is no established market price for either the securities of
the issuer or similar securities of other issuers or the issuer is in the
[Vol. 37:3
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development phase and does not have a record of earnings, primary
consideration will be given to the proposed offering price established
by the underwriters if there is a firm commitment by the underwriters
and the proposed underwriters have the financial ability to perform
their commitment in light of their net capital positions. If, in the judg-
ment of the commissioner, doubt is raised as to the fair, just and eq-
uitable nature of the offering based on known facts, the principle
underwriter may be asked to present to the commissioner an analysis
supporting the determination of such principal underwriter to market
the securities at the proposed offering price including the factors ap-
plied, such as potential earnings, the ability and experience of man-
agement, the contributions of promoters to the business, and the voting
and preferential rights of the proposed issue of securities, and any other
factors relied upon the underwriter. The commissioner, upon receipt of
the analysis, will make a determination as to whether such a price is
fair, just and equitable in light of the factors on which such analysis
was based and other factors when the commissioner may deem appro-
priate.
TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 113.3(4) (1979).
Options and warrants are rights to purchase a company's shares. They are
generally held by officers and directors as a means of compensation and thus can
cause dilution of outside shareholders' interests in the firm. Furthermore, the
options tend to be exercised at a time when the firm's earnings are high and
hence not in need of the capital. From an efficiency perspective then the options
are also a concern. Regulators' concern about options and warrants centers on
dilution and the reasonableness of them with respect to employee and manage-
ment incentives. Another concern is the issuance of options and warrants to
underwriters. See North American Securities Administrators Association state-
ment of policy, NASAA Reports (CCH) para. 2801.
30 These fees are usually regulated by the standard of "reasonable amount" or
as a maximum percentage limitation and are designed to prevent excessive di-
lution. The impact of this form of merit regulation is significant since riskier
offerings will necessarily require higher fees by underwriters and result in an
elimination by market factors as opposed to the merit of the offering. See Em-
pirical Research Project, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statutes: New Im-
portance for an Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. L. 689, 712 (1982).
31 This concern arises primarily in debt offerings where the regulators' concerns
are the ability of the firm to service the debt. In some cases, state regulators
escrow promoters' stock until earnings reach an acceptable level. See A.L.I., FED.
SEC. CODE tit. 1 § 506.
32 The idea behind this form of merit regulation is that those who do the
contributing are those who should control. See, e.g., TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, §
113.3(6) (1979), which provides:
Voting Rights. In offerings of non-voting shares or shares with dispro-
portionate voting rights, which offerings normally are not fair, just,
and equitable, the commissioner may consider whether or not the dis-
parity in voting rights is a temporary condition and whether or not
the deprived shareholder receives an offsetting benefit (e.g., dividend
preference or preference in liquidation) to compensate for such dis-
parity.
Excessive debt is often used as a standard for reviewing the general health
of the firm. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1921(4) (Supp. 1988).
This generic standard could refer to the offering's price; see TEx. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 7, § 113.3(2) (1981), or used generically as the standard for review; see
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140 (Deering's Supp. 1989).
31 For example, the offering could be escrowed in some states and subject to
no restrictions in other states. An issuer could find itself with large blocks of
stock tied up in various jurisdictions.
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jurisdictional issue becomes critical, for if states have powers that extend
beyond state borders, then approval in all states becomes a necessity. For
example, if a state can regulate an offering simply because of closings
occurring in the state, the effect of the state's non-approval is the veto of
a national offering. Hence it is the issue of jurisdiction which controls
the degree of impediment states hold in their reviews. Given the incon-
sistencies in regulations and their application, the question of the scope
of authority of the regulators or how far the regulatory arm of the state
can extend in controlling securities offerings is one that has been an-
swered in certain respects but remains unclear in those cases in which
the offeror has minimal contact with the state, particularly in the exe-
cution of an offering. Several basic questions arise in these minimum
contact cases with respect to a state's authority:
(1) Can state regulators preclude sales of securities within that state?
(2) Can state regulators preclude sales of securities from operations
conducted within that state?
(3) Can state regulators preclude all sales on the basis of the offeror's
activities within that state?
These three questions represent the areas of supremacy and commerce
clause conflict between state and federal securities regulations and are
separately discussed in the following sections.
III. THE CROSSOVERS: STEPPING ON THE TOES OF
THE SUPREMACY AND COMMERCE CLAUSES
A. The Limitation of Sales Within a State Under the
Authority of State Blue Sky Laws: Scenarios One and Two
As noted in the preceding section, states have been given full federal
authority to develop schemes for regulation of securities, and the only
constraints against such regulation would be the generic commerce clause
restriction that the statute not "discriminate against interstate com-
merce. '36 It is clear from the Uniform Securities Act that the question of
a state's jurisdiction is left to the states, with the states resorting to
common law principles for resolution of issues relating to their jurisdic-
tion.37 Thus, the states have only certain constraints when dealing with
36 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987).
'7 The Uniform Securities Act relies on the language "in this state" but for all
its detail does not resolve the issue of scope of jurisdiction for the state. Section
414 provides:
Section 414. [Scope of the Act and Service of Process]
[Sellers]
(a) Sections 101, 210(a), 301, 405, and 410 apply to persons who sell or offer to
sell when (1) an offer to sell is made in this state, or (2) an offer to buy is made
and accepted in this state.
[Vol. 37:3
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sales of securities to state residents. One such constraint is the commerce
clause prohibition on discriminatory regulation designed to help in-state
firms while impeding foreign firms' abilities to sell securities in the state.38
For example, if a merit review process applied to foreign corporations,
but domestic corporations were subject only to a disclosure type of review,
the state would be discriminating against out-of-state firms even if the
state could show the need to obtain more information on firms not subject
to in-state records requirements.
39
Discriminatory regulation would also occur if blue sky laws were in-
applicable to domestic corporations but applicable to out-of-state corpo-
rations, since the result would be to provide domestic corporations with
an unfair advantage over foreign corporations in the state's capital mar-
[Buyers]
(b) Sections 101, 210(a), and 405 apply to persons who buy or offer to buy when
(1) an offer to buy is made in this state, or (2) an offer to sell is made and accepted
in this state.
[Offer in this State]
(c) For the purpose of this section, an offer to sell or to buy is made in this state,
whether or not either party is then present in this state, when the offer (1)
originates from this state or (2) is directed by the offeror to this state and received
at the place to which it is directed (or at any post office in this state in the case
of a mailed offer).
[Acceptance in this State]
(d) For the purpose of this section, an offer to buy or sell is accepted in this state
when acceptance (1) is communicated to the offeror in this state and (2) has not
previously been communicated to the offeror, orally or in writing, outside this
state; and acceptance is communicated to the offeror in this state, whether or not
either party is then present in this state, when the offeree directs it to the offeror
in this state reasonably believing the offeror to be in this state and it is received
at the place to which it is directed (or at any post office in this state in the case
of a mailed acceptance).
[Publications, Radio and Television]
(e) An offer to sell or to buy is not made in this state when (1) the publisher
circulates or there is circulated on his behalf in this state any bona fide newspaper
or other publication of general, regular, and paid circulation which is not pub-
lished in this state, or which is published in this state but has had more than
two-thirds of its circulation outside this state during the past twelve months, or
(2) a radio or television program originating outside this state is received in this
state.
UNF. SEC. ACT § 414(a)-(e), 7B UNIF. L. ANN. 673.
38 See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987):
("The principal objects of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that
discriminate against interstate commerce.").
39 See Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) in which a state regulation
requiring in-state packing of cantaloupes discriminated against firms with an
out-of-state packing facility by, in effect, requiring them to have two business
facilities while Arizona firms needed only one. Arizona's claimed need to prevent
deceptive packing was not sufficiently related to the requirement of an in-state
facility and, therefore, did not justify the burden on interstate commerce.
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kets.40 The fascinating perspective of merit review is that it appears to
discriminate in opposite fashion; that is, it discriminates against opera-
tions within the state in that it places greater hurdles on domestic offerors
than on foreign offerors. Foreign offerors have the choice of simply not
offering in the state, while domestic firms appear to be jurisdictionally
bound to comply with state law and approval for sales. In addition to the
commerce clause prohibition against discrimination, there is the addi-
tional component of the clause that invalidates those statutes which ad-
versely affect interstate commerce. 41 The process of determining whether
a statute imposes an impermissible burden on interstate commerce is one
of balancing the interests of the state with the extent of the burden
imposed by the regulation. The general rule for evaluating the state
regulation was set forth by the Supreme Court in Pike u. Bruce Church,
Inc. :42
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a le-
gitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate com-
merce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found,
then the question becomes one of degree. 41
As early as 1917, the Supreme Court recognized the interest of the
states in the regulation of securities sales as one of protection of the
public." The problems of inconvenience from different state regulations
-' See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980), in which a
Florida statute prohibiting out-of-state banks, trusts, and bank holding companies
from owning businesses within the state which provide investment advisory serv-ices was held unconstitutional under the commerce clause; and Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), in which a New Jersey statute that prohibited
the importation of solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside
the territorial limits of the state was held to be unconstitutional under the com-
merce clause.
41 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
42 397 U.S. 137 (1970).40Id. at 142 (citation omitted).
See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917), in which the Court stated
in determining the validity of an Ohio Statute which required securities dealers
to obtain a license:
It will be observed, therefore, that the law is a regulation of business,
constraints conduct only to that end, the purpose being to protect the
public against the imposition of unsubstantial schemes and the secu-
rities based upon them. Whatever prohibition there is, is a means to
the same purpose, made necessary, it may be supposed, by the per-
sistence of evil and its insidious forms and the experience of the in-
adequacy of penalties or other repressive measures. The name that is
given to the law indicates the evil at which it is aimed, that is, to use
the language of a cited case, "speculative schemes which have no more
basis than so many feet of 'blue-sky' "; or, as stated by counsel in
another case, "to stop the sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, vi-
sionary oil wells, distant gold mines and other like fraudulent exploi-
tations." Even if the descriptions be regarded as rhetorical, the
existence of evil is indicated, and a belief of its detriment; and we shall
not pause to do more than state that the prevention of deception is
within the competency of government and that the appreciation of the
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were not sufficient for a finding that such regulations were an unconsti-
tutional burden under the commerce clause.45 It is clear that today's
standards for state securities registration are more detailed and stringent
than those few that existed at the time the federal securities statutes
were adopted and the state protection afforded. 46 However, it is also clear
that in spite of fierce opposition, merit regulation has survived most
commerce clause challenges. 47 For example, state regulators have con-
stitutional authority to require a seller to obtain a license before selling
securities in the state,48 halt the sale of securities in a state for the
offering's failure to meet state standards, 49 and prosecute those who vi-
olate state securities laws.5° In short, state regulators have the power to
45Again, in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., the court stated: "Inconvenience may be
caused and supervision and surveillance, but this must yield to the public welfare;
.Id. at 552.
At the time the Secruities Act was enacted, Kansas had its own statute
because of its vulnerability:
The State of Kansas, most wonderfully prolific and rich in farming
products, has a large population of agriculturists not versed in ordinary
business methods. This State was the hunting ground of promoters of
fraudulent enterprises; in fact their frauds became so barefaced that
it was stated that they would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee
simple. Metonymically they became known as blue sky merchants, and
the legislation intended to prevent their frauds was called Blue Sky
Law.
Mulvey, Blue Sky Law 36 CAN. L. TIMES 37 (1916).
47 See L. Loss & E. CowETT, BLUE SKY LAW 3-10 (1958).
4 See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917), supra notes 6, 11, 12, 49,
50. See also Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick
v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), the court noted:
States have traditionally regulated intrastate securities transactions,
and this Court has upheld the authority of States to enact "blue-sky"
laws against Commerce Clause challenges on several occasions (cita-
tions omitted). The Court's rationale for upholding blue-sky laws was
that they only regulated transactions occurring within the regulating
States. "The provisions of the law.., apply to dispositions of securities
within the State and while information of those issued in other States
and foreign countries is required to be filed.. . , they are only affected
by the requirement of a license of one who deals with them within the
State ... Such regulations affect interstate commerce in [securities]
only incidentally." Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., (citations omitted). Con-
gress has also recognized the validity of such laws governing intrastate
securities transactions in 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. 78 bb(a), a provision "designed to save state blue-sky laws from
pre-emption. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182
n.13 (1979).
Id. at 641.
For early cases, see Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell
v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N. W. Halsey &
Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917). For later cases see, e.g., Underhill Assoc. Inc. v. Brad-
shaw, 674 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1982); Lintz v. Carey Manor Ltd., 613 F. Supp. 543
(W.D. Va. 1985); Oil Resources, Inc. v. Florida, 583 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D. Fla. 1984);
Enntex Oil & Gas Co. vs. State, 560 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Cf. Mon-
Shore Mgmt., Inc. v. Family Media, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 186 (S.D. N.Y. 1984).
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prevent, enjoin, and prosecute any "in-state" illegal securities activities.51
While these local regulatory activities generally are presumptively per-
mitted, the wisdom of such a piecemeal approach in a national capital
market governed by a significantly detailed federal regulatory scheme is
questionable. 52 The varying regulation of securities brokers and dealers
is no different than the various licensing requirements throughout the
states for other professions. However, such licensing is ostensibly for a
lifetime, while a securities offering is executed quickly and is critically
timed according to market conditions. The impact of the various forms
of state securities registration can create confusion in initial sales if
approval is piecemeal. Some investors can participate in the initial gains
often made in the market place during the rapid sales and resales made
immediately upon public notice and availability,53 while investors in those
states in which approval for sale of the offering was not obtained can only
hope to participate in secondary sales. 54
51 The scope of the authority to regulate "from" the state is discussed in detail
in section III B of this article, which deals with sales "from" the state as opposed
to "in" the state. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. For authority on
"in-state", see North Star Int'l v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578 (9th Cir.
1983).
52 See, e.g., Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to Investors or Burden
on Commerce? 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 105 (1987), in which the author notes:
State merit regulation is a burden on interstate commerce and stands
as an obstacle to the achievement of the SEC's statutory goals of fa-
cilitating capital formation and the establishment of a national market
system (NMS). Further, the basic philosophical conflict between federal
and state regulation will become increasingly troublesome as the SEC
grapples with the problems of regulating the market for corporate
control of large public companies and participating in the regulation
of international capital markets.
Id. at 107 (footnote omitted).
According to the finance literature, many offerings experience a period after
initial sales when an initial purchaser could resell for gain in the secondary
market before the leveling off effect occurs. However, those who are not primary
purchasers lose the time frame needed for that initial gain. See Chen, Roll, &
Ross, Economic Forces and the Stock Market, 59 J. Bus. 383 (July 1986).
One question that arises from this effect is which investors merit review is
trying to protect. From the observed market phenomenon it appears the effect of
prohibition of sales in a state is to require that state's investors to wait and see
the general market reaction before investing in the securities. Again, this pause
causes those investors to lose out on the initial returns to be made if the stock
gains momentum immediately upon its public offering.
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Although regulating "in-state" transactions seems to be a relatively
simple concept, the nature of the capital market and its universality can
result in the following scenarios:
1) Sales of securities by domestic (state A) corporations to state A
residents
2) Sales of securities by foreign corporations to state A residents
3) Sales of securities by a domestic corporation from state A to those
outside state A
4) Sales of securities by a foreign corporation from state A to non-
residents
5) Sales of securities by a foreign corporation to A residents but oc-
curring in state B
6) Sales of securities by a foreign corporation to non-residents but the
transaction occurs in state A
7) Sales of securities by a domestic corporation only outside the state
and only to non-residents.
The justification for all of these scenarios is that state A has an interest
in regulating transactions in the state in order to uphold the state's
reputation. There is a further interest in protecting the state's citizens
regardless of where they happen to consummate sales.5 5 As one moves
down the above list, the scope of state regulation expands, the conflict
with federal approval increases, and the state regulation becomes a more
significant burden on the offeror's national approach to raising capital.
Scenarios one and two are clear constitutional exercises of state regu-
latory authority, but the remaining scenarios are the focus of Arizona
Corporation Commission v. Media Products, Inc., r and the center of dis-
cussions on the role of state regulators.
1 There is some support for this notion of "extraterritorial" protection in the
field of international law, for the U.S. Government hasjurisdiction over its citizens
(foreign and natural) anywhere in the world. Such a discussion is beyond the
scope of this article, but see, e.g., ITT v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
30(1)(a) (1965); Thomas, Extraterritorial Application of the United States Secu-
rities Laws: The Need for a Balanced Policy, 7 J. Corn. L 189 (1982).
56 763 P.2d 527 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
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B. Scenario Three: The Regulation of Sales "from" the State
The Uniform Securities Act,5 7 which has been adopted in 39 states, 58
is applicable to sales without regard to a seller's citizenship or residence. 59
Some states' versions of the Act have made the state blue sky laws ap-
plicable to sales "in and from" the state.60 Other states require registration
for "sale in this state,"'" and judicial construction has been liberal in
determining the scope of jurisdiction under the general phrase.6 2 The
concern in regulating sales not made to state residents but made "from"
the state is that the state gains a reputation as a launching pad for
boilerroom operations that perpetrate frauds on the rest of the nation.63
Courts have been supportive of the regulators' use of the police power in
this manner. It could be argued that such state regulation is necessary
where the offeror somehow slipped between the federal and state juris-
dictional coverage in registration.6 4
11 The Uniform Securities Act is a product of the work of NAASA (North
American Association of Securities Administrators), securities lawyers and legal
scholars with Louis Loss being a principal in the undertaking. See 7B UNIF. L.
ANN. 510 (1985).56The thirty-nine states or territories which have adopted or substantially
adopted the Uniform Securities Act include:




Connecticut Minnesota Puerto Rico
Delaware Mississippi South Carolina




Indiana New Hampshire West Virginia
Iowa New Jersey Wisconsin
Kansas New Mexico Wyoming
1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) para. 5500 (1989).
9 The drafters of the Uniform Securities Act consciously rejected citizenship
or residence within a particular state as the policy base for the application for
the Act. Instead, they elected a territorial base, requiring that a transaction have
some physical nexus with a state. 12 J. LONG, supra note 1, at § 3.02 [3]-[7].
60 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1841 (1987) which provides: "It is un-
lawful to sell or offer for sale within or from this state any securities unless such
securities have been registered." (emphasis added)
61 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2 Para. 137.5, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1989); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 25008(a) (West 1977) which provides in pertinent part:(a) An offer or sale of a security is made in this state when an offer to
sell is made in this state, or an offer to buy is accepted in this state,
or (if both the seller and the purchaser are domiciled in this state) the
security is delivered to the purchaser in this state. An offer to buy or
a purchase of a security is made in this state when an offer to buy is
made in this state, or an offer to sell is accepted in this state, or (if
both the seller and the purchaser are domiciled in this state) the se-
curity is delivered to the purchaser in this state.
12 See Lintz v. Carey Manor Ltd., 613 F.Supp. 543 (W.D. Va. 1985).
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
'4 The federal laws were passed in 1933 in spite of the fact that every state
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C. Scenario Four: Arizona Corporation Commission v. Media Products
and the Length of the Regulatory Arm
The more tenuous jurisdictional issues of scenarios four through seven
create a field ripe for harvest at the hands of a commerce clause or preemp-
tion challenge. Mixed metaphors aside, it has become clear that the scope
of state regulation has been expanding.6 5 The scenario in Arizona Cor-
poration Commission v. Media Products, Inc.66 combines several of the
elements given in the remaining scenarios. Media Products, a Delaware
corporation with principal offices located in Arizona, hired a Spokane,
Washington underwriter to sell its unseasoned public stock offering of
1,300,000 shares. The initial public offering (IPO) was registered with
the SEC and in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
Washington. Media Products had applied for Arizona registration but
later withdrew its application6 7 and informed the Securities Division of
the Arizona Corporation Commission that it would proceed with the of-
fering in the other states. The Commission maintained that going forward
with the offering without Arizona approval would be a violation of Arizona
securities laws, and filed suit to enjoin the public offering and assess civil
penalties.
Arizona's statute permitted jurisdiction in sales "from" the state. 68 The
Commission took the position that Media Products was subject to Arizona
jurisdiction, noting that:
(a) Media Products' principal place of business and base of operations
was in Arizona; (b) Media Products' officers and directors resided in Ar-
izona; (c) stock certificates were prepared and issued in Arizona; (d) Board
meetings took place in Arizona; (e) Notice address on the offering was in
Arizona; and (f) closing for the offering occurred in Arizona.6 9
The amici brief noted that having a principal place of business in a
state did not subject the offeror to that state's blue sky laws.70 However,
the court correctly noted that Arizona had not adopted the Uniform Se-
curities Act and found the sales had occurred "from" the state.
except Nevada had blue-sky laws, for the more clever of the issuers were able to
develop interstate schemes and escape any form of regulation. See e.g., Gadsby,
Historical Development of the SEC - The Government View, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
6 (1959); M. PARRISH, SECUmTIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL (1970).
For example, when the Supreme Court handed down CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), a case in which a state corporate takeover
law was held not to be preempted simply because of a Williams Act filing, many
state securities regulators viewed the case as a victory for state jurisdictional
powers not only in the area of takeovers. CTS Corp., in essence, expanded state
jurisdictional power, in contrast to previous limits on such power (Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
763 P.2d 527 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
617 The securities division of the Arizona Corporation Commission issued a de-
ficiency letter on the proposed offering noting problems with the offering, and
Media Products withdrew its application shortly thereafter.
68 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1841 (1987).
69 763 P.2d at 529.
70 The Amici brief, quoted in 12 J. LONG, supra note 1, at § 3.02[3], provides:
"mere maintenance of a principal place of business or any place of business within
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This initial finding of the court was largely irrelevant given its decision
that Arizona's statute violated the commerce clause. The court noted that
the state has no legitimate interest in protecting non-residents:
Under the facts of this case, Arizona had no duty to the pur-
chasers whose home states had already determined that the
offerings met their own state's standards and had registered
the offerings in those states and with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. To hold otherwise would allow the Com-
mission to have an effective veto over offerings and sales
approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission and se-
curities officials from other states, even though no purchases
were made by Arizona residents.7'
In response to the Commission's concern about Arizona's reputation, the
court found a prohibition of sales to be overly broad given the clear
delineation of the corporation's origins in the prospectus.72 The dissenting
opinion in the case noted that Media Products was an "Arizona enter-
prise," and cited the long-recognized state interest in preventing its ter-
ritory from being used as a base of operations for unregulated transactions
as sufficient to justify the burden on interstate commerce. 73 Some have
questioned the court's interpretation of "from," but the constitutional
analysis appears to be sound.7 4
D. Scenario Five: Sales to Residents Outside the State
States have an interest in protecting their citizens regardless of where
those citizens happen to be.7 5 No serious challenges have been brought
under this scenario, 76 and this jurisdictional aspect also appears to afford
those citizens the private right of suit based on their local laws in spite
of the non-resident transaction.77
11 763 P.2d at 533.
72 'The prospectus and supplement placed prospective purchasers on notice that
Media Products was a Delaware corporation, that the offerings and sales were
not approved by the Arizona Corporation Commission ...." Id. at 533-34.
13 Judge Corcoran noted that Tennessee, Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah gainedill repute for serving as host states for questionable securities activity. Id. at 534(Corcoran, J., dissenting).
14 See 12 J. LONG, supra note 1, at § 3.02.
75 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25008 (West 1989).
16 See, e.g., Western Air Lines Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal.Rptr. 719 (1961). However, this assumes some delivery or closing in the state.The jurisdictional issue is quite different if the citizens consummate the deal
outside the state altogether. See Cal. Corp. Comm'n Interpretative Op. No. 70/168, 2 Cal. Corp. Comm'n Official Op. (Dec. 31, 1970). Accord Cal. Corp. Comm'n
Interpretative Op. No. 73/270, 5 Cal. Corp. Comm'n Official Op. (March 5, 1973).
17 See Lintz v. Carey Manor, Ltd., 613 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D. Fla. 1984); But seeGaillard v. Field, 381 F.2d 25 (10th Cir. 1967) (involving an issue of whether aplaintiff could recover under California securities law when Oklahoma holds oil
and gas interests which do not constitute securities), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044(1968).
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E. Scenario Six: Sales by Foreign Corporations to
Non-Residents with Use of a State
The boiler room operation theory which applies in this situation brings
this analysis very close to scenario four but removes the questionable
aspect of "from" and has the offeror use the state for solicitation, close of
escrow, or some other part of the transaction. Without any further activ-
ity, the language of the Uniform Securities Act would not afford juris-
diction, but constitutionally the cases appear very similar to those in
which residents are outside the state. If some portion of the transaction
returns to the state, then regulation would be within commerce clause
standards.
F. Scenario Seven: Sales by Domestic Corporations
Outside the State and Only to Non-Residents
This scenario differs from Media Products in that the offering will be
handled entirely outside the state. Two states have determined there is
no blue sky jurisdiction unless the domestic corporation answers tele-
phone inquiries regarding the securities which would put the transaction
into the sales-"from"-a-state category.
78
IV. WHO IS REALLY IN CHARGE? Is THERE A NEED FOR
DUPLICITOUS STATE REGULATION?
While Congress, and to a large extent, the courts have attempted to
delineate the differences between state and federal regulations and the
insignificant burden of state regulation, the fact is the state rules remain
obstacles to a uniform and national capital market. For example, even
the Regulation D exemptions 79 are subject to some state regulation and
may require, pursuant to scenario seven, full registration if the home
office wants to be able to answer questions about the offering directly (as
is required under Regulation D).80 In some states, an offeror may have
to escrow its stock in order to obtain registration. These two abilities
alone give state regulators veto power over transactions intended to be
national in scope. Additionally, it is possible that the denial or withdrawal
of registration in one state may influence the market's reaction partic-
ularly in the case of an initial public offering.
78 See Cal. Corp. Comm'n Interpretative Op. No. 81/10C, 11 Cal. Corp. Comm'n
Official Op. (Nov. 12, 1981) (calls from outside the state to general partner from
potential investors made it an offer "from" the state); Op. Utah Att'y Gen., [1954-
1961 Transfer Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 70,245 (Oct. 8, 1954) (local
office could not give corporation's home office number in response to securities
offerings inquiries).
78 Regulation D - Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities
Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-506
(1982).
w See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(v) (1988), which requires that all purchasers
be allowed to ask questions about the offering and have them answered. 19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1989
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
A. Financial Impact
Apart from the legal arguments related to the commerce and supremacy
clauses, there are the financial market arguments against varying and
piecemeal regulation. First, proponents of merit review assume that reg-
ulators are able to uncover or obtain additional information, akin to thelevel of inside information, that the market would not already have.8 '
Further, even assuming the regulators had such information, the as-
sumption inherent in merit review is that those who perpetrate frauds
always go to the time, trouble, and effort of registering their offerings.82
The state regulatory schemes for securities have been permitted to exist
to the point of control within, without, and through the states and there
is a resultant loss of the market forces as evaluators of business and its
potential. Merit review at the state level is a substitution of state reg-
ulators'judgment for that of the capital market, or in some cases, a change
by state regulators in the offering structure in order for the offeror to
obtain approval. State blue sky laws were originally permitted to preclude
the problem of firms avoiding SEC registration on the grounds of intras-
tate activity under the commerce clause protection. Presently those blue
sky laws have grown to the point of a national veto based on the public
interest argument for the regulation. Blue sky laws represent a web of
complexities for an initial public offering having immeasurable effects
running from a lack of offerings, to ill-timed offerings, to interference
with the natural selection of the market. In the long run, it is the financial
and economic arguments that prove stronger than federal preemption or
supremacy. While the legal debate enlarges, the capital market fragments
and foreign markets grow.
B. Avoiding Duplicity and Enjoying Uniformity:
Exemptions, Clearing Houses, and Long Arms
The implementation of several procedures could avoid the unnecessary
conflicts and overlap resulting from this dual system. First, there is the
need for uniform application of Regulation D with state recognition of
those federal exemptions. Such a step would not only avoid the potential
conflicts noted earlier in trying to meet federal requirements without
invoking all the state registration requirements, but could also remove
some of the cost barriers that still remain for smaller offerings. Second,
81 It often appears that merit analysis was developed in a vacuum apart from
the research in finance, particularly that work which relates to the efficient
market hypothesis. When merit review precludes an offering, the review is, in
effect, attempting to control risk in the market place and assumes that regulatorshave information the market did not already have. See Morton, On Estimating
the Expected Return on the Market, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 323 (Dec. 1980).Again, the finance literature is directly to the contrary: it costs too muchjust to register securities at a national level and the possibility for long-term
survival is completely lost. These two factors serve as a greater hindrance tofraudulent offerings than the registration review. Darby & Karni, Free Compe-
tition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J. LAW & EcoN. 16 (1973).
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state administrators of registration programs, particularly for those
states with some form of merit review, should develop a central clearing
or processing office for national registrations. In that office, experienced
regulators would review the offering for all the criteria used by the var-
ious states in reviewing the merits of an offering. That clearing office
would then issue a report with recommendations. The offeror would have
the same opportunity to provide additional information and respond to
concerns that would be available in working with state regulators. State
regulators would fund, manage, and set policy and review guidelines for
the central processing unit. The benefits are that the states retain the
opportunity to review offerings for something more than full disclosure
but offerors are not subject to duplicity in the merit review process. At
present, state regulators have certain procedures in place that would
facilitate such a central clearing house. A uniform application is used
and the application requires offerors to list the other states where ap-
proval for sale has been obtained or is pending, so that exchange of
information with other regulators is possible.
The details regarding state acceptance of central clearance could be
established, but state autonomy on additional securities regulation could
be retained while the lack of uniformity impeding international capital
market strategies would be eliminated. Resolving the jurisdictional scope
of the states is difficult. If the idea is to have some state regulation, it
would be more consistent to regulate on a central basis with a shopping
list of merit issues that would permit the central clearance. In such a
system, the jurisdictional issues become irrelevant since all sales in states
desiring more control than mere disclosure would be assured of adequate
review. The issue of jurisdiction would become irrelevant with the cre-
ation of the equivalent of a national credit bureau for securities. The
jurisdictional issues would still arise between merit and non-merit states,
but the conflicts between merit states would be resolved with a hopefully
uniform and central review of proposed offerings.
The system is not without flaws. State autonomy, particularly with its
political genesis is difficult to eliminate and the system almost requires
states to behave uniformly. However, the capital market is no longer a
U.S. market and territorialism could be costly. The point of a uniform or
centralized system is not to deprive investors of protection or regulators
of the opportunity to screen offerings, but rather to ensure consistency
in reviews and to institute a system of expectations. The presence of a
uniform system at least delineates the issues for those entering the capital
markets and eliminates the surprises and inconsistencies that result from
state-to-state review by ever-changing staffs and regulators.
As the United States moves into a decade which has begun with the
elimination of the European common market and the elimination of the
Berlin wall and Lenin's vision of Russia, it is not difficult to conclude
that trade barriers are nearly nonexistent. Capital barriers have neces-
sarily followed suit and businesses are operating in a unified financial
market and a global market-place that knows no country-to-country bar-
rier or boundary. This new global business methodology mandates
streamlined operations and regulations in a company's domestic head-
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1989
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quarters for effective international competition. A firm that cannot rely
on its own regulators to act quickly and consistently will be required to
operate with a time disadvantage in the international markets.
Presently, regulators and businesses are faced with a tradeoff between
the ability to compete effectively in a world-wide market and the need
for individual and state-by-state review of offerings. The trade-off is not,
fortunately, an either/or proposition. Rather, the compromise of a cen-
tralized review process may offer a resolution that satisfies the political
issue of investment protection, but allows the expedited and consistent
review needed for effective participation in the international capital mar-
kets.
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